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INTRODUCTION
There is one issue presented by this appeal: Whether Appellee Gerald
McCoy's insurance policy was effectively amended to include a mandatory arbitration
provision. As Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah ("Blue Cross") shows below, it
was. Mr. McCoy is required to arbitrate his claims against Blue Cross.
McCoy's brief confuses that issue. In presenting his view of the merits of
his claim, rather than its arbitrability, Mr. McCoy incorrectly implies that Frieda
McCoy died because Blue Cross failed to process her claim for coverage of a bone
marrow transplant in a timely manner. Actually, according to McCoy's Complaint,
the initial claim for coverage in this case was filed on March 1, 1994. (R. 4). Blue
Cross' denial of the claim came shortly thereafter on March 17, 1994. (R. 4). In
April, before even appealing Blue Cross' denial, Frieda McCoy received the treatment
for which coverage was sought. (R. 5). At all times thereafter, this dispute was not
about whether Mrs. McCoy would be able to receive the treatment, but rather, who
would pay for treatment already received. McCoy nevertheless paints a picture of
Blue Cross causing Frieda McCoy's death by somehow delaying her receipt of the
treatment. That is simply a fallacy. More importantly, although Blue Cross' internal
handling of Frieda McCoy's claim may be relevant to the underlying merits of
McCoy's bad faith claim, it is in no way relevant to the simple issue now before the
Court, which is whether a district court is the proper forum for the adjudication of
Mr. McCoy's claims.
295755.1
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ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT CAN MAKE AN INDEPENDENT
DETERMINATION BASED UPON THE RECORD
IN THIS CASE.

McCoy objects to Blue Cross' articulation of the appropriate standard of
review in this case. Blue Cross has cited controlling authority for the proposition that
this Court's review of the trial court's ruling should be de novo. See e.g., Sosa v.
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996); In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918
(Utah App. 1988). Because the trial court's ruling was based solely on documentary
evidence, "and involved no assessment of witness credibility or competency, this court
is in as good a position as the trial court to examine the evidence de novo and
determine the facts." In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d at 918. This Court is not
required to defer to the trial court's findings of fact in this case.
However, even assuming that some deference to the trial court's factual
findings is required, there is only one factual finding contrary to Blue Cross' position
in this matter, and that finding is clearly erroneous. Specifically, the court found that
"Blue Cross relies solely on the affidavit of Ms. [Edwina] Green as evidence that they
mailed an arbitration amendment to Mr. McCoy." (R. 277). To the contrary, Blue
Cross submitted four affidavits on the issue of mailing: the Affidavit of Edwina Green
(R. 30), the Supplemental Affidavit of Edwina Green (R. 242), the Affidavit of Gary
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Nelsen (R. 249), and the Affidavit of Gary Warner (R. 237).l Clearly, Blue Cross
did not rely "solely" on the Affidavit of Edwina Green; the trial court's finding in this
regard is plain error, and cannot be sustained under any standard of review.2
Ultimately, where the trial court erred was in criticizing the form of proof
offered by Blue Cross. By suggesting that Blue Cross was required to show
something more than proof of mailing, the trial court effectively required Blue Cross
to show proof of receipt, and by a higher standard than merely a preponderance of the
evidence. This ruling contradicts controlling law as well as the plain language of the
policy. This error was a legal conclusion, and should therefore be reviewed de novo.
II.

ARBITRATION IS MANDATORY BECAUSE BLUE
CROSS ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF A
VALID AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE.

Where, as here, a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, both the Federal
Arbitration Act and the Utah Arbitration Act require arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 2; Utah
Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (1985). Blue Cross has established that a valid arbitration
provision existed in Gerald McCoy's policy for nearly a decade prior to this dispute.
Specifically, Blue Cross has shown that in 1985, Mr. McCoy was mailed an
endorsement and cover letter (collectively, the "First Mailing") amending his policy to
1

McCoy correctly notes that the Affidavit of Gary Warner is incorrectly entitled
"Affidavit of Keith Stoddard". This is simply a typographical error; the affidavit was
properly executed by Mr. Warner.
2

A trial court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the clear weight of
the evidence. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). That standard is easily met
with respect to the contested finding here.
295755.1
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include a mandatory arbitration provision. Blue Cross has also shown that under the
express terms of the policy, notice of such a modification was effective upon mailing.
In addition, Blue Cross has shown that Mr. McCoy was twice mailed copies of the
amended policy, including the arbitration provision, in 1986 and again in 1990
(respectively, the "Second Mailing" and "Third Mailing"). This evidence is more
than sufficient to establish the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate.
A.

Blue Cross Met its Burden as to Proof of Mailing.

McCoy relies primarily on Litster v. Utah Valley Community College, 881
P.2d 933, 940-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), as support for the proposition that Blue
Cross did not meet its burden of proof of mailing. However, the evidence Blue Cross
submitted in the trial court was clearly sufficient under Litster to establish proof of
mailing. In Litster, this Court noted:
Courts have long recognized that modern business practices make
direct proof of mailing impractical, and have thus acknowledged the
validity of alternate means of establishing proof of mailing by office
custom. . . . "[I]t has been recognized that, in large offices which
handle a volume of mail, direct proof with respect to a particular
letter is impractical. The courts have held that proof of 'settled
custom and usage of [the sender's] office regularly and
systematically followed in the transaction of its business' may, in
such cases, suffice."
Id. at 939 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
Under Litster, in order to establish an office mailing custom, a party must
provide direct evidence that a document was prepared. Id. at 940. Once preparation
has been established, proof of mailing may be made by evidence of usual business
295755.1
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practice. Id. In the instant case, Blue Cross submitted the Affidavit of Edwina
Green, which stated that in November of 1985, Blue Cross prepared an endorsement
including the arbitration amendment. (R. 31). The Supplemental Affidavit of Edwina
Green stated that Ms. Green directed the preparation of a magnetic tape with the
names of all Blue Cross subscribers who would be affected by the amendments.
(R. 243). Ms. Green testified that Mr. McCoy was such a subscriber, because the
effective date of his policy establishes that his name would have been on that tape.3
(R. 243). Ms. Green further testified that the magnetic tape was sent to Image
Printing on or about November 14, 1985, "for printing of the subscribers' names and
addresses on the cover letter to the amendment endorsement." (R. 244). The
Affidavit of Gary C. Warner stated that Blue Cross delivered the magnetic tape to
Image Printing, together with Blue Cross letterhead, for the printing of the
endorsements and cover letters. (R. 238). The invoice Image Printing sent to Blue
Cross for the printing confirmed that 30,356 letters and cover letters were, in fact,
prepared. (R. 248).4

3

As previously noted, Mr. McCoy's name was originally input into Blue Cross'
system as a subscriber to a 1GE plan, which is a group plan, on or about October 1, 1985.
(R. 244). Approximately one week later, Mr. McCoy's insurance was converted to a 57H
non-group individual contract. Id. The magnetic tape prepared at Ms. Green's instruction
included the names of all subscribers to both types of plans. Id.
4

McCoy points to an apparent discrepancy between the number of pages printed and
the number sent as evidence that some letters which should have been sent were not.
However, he raises this issue for the first time on appeal; it was not raised in the trial court.
Consequently, under well-established principles of appellate procedure, the argument has
(continued...)
295755.1
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The foregoing evidence distinguishes the instant case from the facts in
Litster, in which the only evidence of preparation was an attorney's statement that he
had instructed his secretary to prepare a document, and that it was her normal practice
to comply with his instructions within one or two days. Here, Blue Cross provided
evidence of the actual preparation of the endorsement, the preparation of the magnetic
tape of the subscribers' names and addresses, the receipt of the magnetic tape by the
printer, and the printer's confirmation of completion of the task. This case easily
meets the standard in Lkster, because Blue Cross has submitted abundant "direct
evidence . . . pertaining to the preparation of the letter." Litster, 881 P.2d 933, 941
(Utah App. 1994).
Under Lkster, once a party establishes that the document was prepared, habit
or custom evidence is sufficient to establish that it was mailed. Id. at 940. Here,
Blue Cross has shown, by the Affidavits of Gary C. Warner and Gary Nelsen, that

4

(...continued)
been waived. Connor v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 1998 Utah LEXIS 67 (Utah 1998)
(declining to address issues raised for first time on appeal); Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249
(Utah 1998) ("We therefore follow our longstanding rule that we will not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal.") (citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah
1996)). Moreover, the evidence in the record on which McCoy relies is an invoice from
Image Printing, which indicates only that 70 more letters were printed than were mailed.
The invoice does not establish, nor does anything else in the record, that the discrepancy
means that 70 subscribers were not mailed the endorsements. There is no credible reason to
even infer as much. However, even assuming that out of more than 30,000 affected
subscribers, 70 were not mailed endorsements, the probability of Mr. McCoy being one of
those 70 is minuscule. Blue Cross is only required to show proof of mailing by a
preponderance of the evidence. Clearly, under any view of the evidence submitted to the
trial court, it is more likely than not that Blue Cross mailed Gerald McCoy an endorsement
amending his policy to include mandatory arbitration.
295755.1

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Image Printing delivered these specific endorsements and cover letters to Progressive
Direct Mail Advertising ("Progressive"). The Affidavit of Gary Nelsen states that Mr.
Nelsen then coordinated the mailing of the endorsements and cover letters, and sets
forth the usual business practice of Progressive in completing such projects. (R. 250).
That practice was as follows: Progressive would receive printed documents from a
commercial printer, such as Image Printing. Progressive would then pre-fold the
letters and all enclosures to fit into window envelopes, and employees would put the
folded letters and enclosures into the insertion machine, which would collate and insert
the correct number of pieces into each envelope. The envelopes would then be sealed,
metered, sorted, and delivered to the United States Postal Service, together with the
appropriate form completed by Progressive employees. After verifying the mailing
weight, the Postal Service would then take control of the mailing, and provide
Progressive with confirmation on the number of pieces mailed. (R. 250-52).
The foregoing evidence is plainly sufficient under Litster to establish that the
endorsement was sent to Mr. McCoy. Blue Cross provided direct evidence of the
preparation of the endorsements, and also met its burden as to proof of mailing. It
would be an impossible standard for Blue Cross to meet if it were required to prove
conclusively that it has specific recollection of sending Mr. McCoy's particular
envelope and of inserting the endorsement into that envelope. Litster recognizes this
impracticality. 881 P.2d at 939 n.4 (quoted above). Given the vast number of Blue
Cross subscribers, such a requirement would render the notice provision in Blue
295755.1
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Cross' insurance contracts meaningless. Such a result would be contrary to Utah law,
under which a contract provision making notice effective upon mailing is valid and
enforceable. See Diamond T. Utah, Inc., v. Canal Insurance Company, 361 P.2d 665
(Utah 1961); Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647, 651-52 (Utah
App. 1993) cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). Where such a provision exists,
as here, proof of actual notice is simply not necessary under Utah law, and
Mr. McCoy cannot make it otherwise merely by denying any recollection of receipt.
Blue Cross has met its burden on this issue. By the First Mailing, Blue Cross
effectively amended Gerald McCoy's policy to include a mandatory arbitration
provision.
In addition, as established by the Affidavit of Edwina Green, Blue Cross
twice sent Mr. McCoy copies of the amended policy, which included the mandatory
arbitration provision. (R. 32, 38-47). Mr. McCoy has offered no evidence that the
arbitration provisions weren't mailed; rather, he states only that he cannot recall
receiving them, although he acknowledges receiving, from time to time, explanations
of claims processed referring to a right of arbitration. (R. 135-136). This lack of
knowledge, merely a denial of recollection, is not sufficient to rebut the evidence of
mailing submitted by Blue Cross.
The difficulty Mr. McCoy faces in rebutting Blue Cross' proof of mailing is
simply the result of the original contract, which provides that notice is effective upon
mailing. The risk of non-receipt, and the concomitant risk of proving that a particular
295755.1
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allegedly unreceived piece of a mass-mailing was somehow omitted, lies squarely with
the subscriber. Ten years before this dispute arose, Mr. McCoy agreed, by accepting
the policy issued to him, that notice of amendments would be effective when mailed.
The parties allocated that risk, and the Court should not disturb that allocation by
requiring Blue Cross to prove that Mr. McCoy received that endorsement.
Finally, Blue Cross again notes that, if accepted, McCoy's argument would
mean that, to amend its policy by mail, Blue Cross would be forced to send all
endorsements by certified mail or similar means. In turn, Blue Cross would be
required to collect, compile, and review hundreds of thousands of certified mail
receipts each year, cross referencing them to ensure that each subscriber had
acknowledged receipt. This would necessitate the hiring of an entire staff to collect
and maintain these records. Moreover, Blue Cross would need to maintain these
records indefinitely, in this case, for over ten years. The law cannot require Blue
Cross to take such prohibitively expensive and onerous steps to amend its policy.
B,

McCoy Did Not Argue Below that Blue Cross Did Not
Show First Class Mailing.

McCoy argues that Blue Cross "did not meet its burden of showing that it
complied with the contract requirements for notice." Brief of Appellee, p. 25.
McCoy contends that Blue Cross has not demonstrated compliance with this provision
because it has not shown that the endorsements were sent by first class mail. Notably,
McCoy offers no proof to the contrary, and, again, Blue Cross need only show the

295755.1
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existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.5 In any
event, this issue was not raised in the trial court. Because Blue Cross was never
given the opportunity to respond to this claim by providing evidence that the
endorsements were mailed first class, that issue cannot be considered on appeal. See
e.g., Connor v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 1998 Utah LEXIS 67 (Utah 1998); Julian
v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998).
C,

Blue Cross' Modification of the Policy Complied with
Governing Law.

McCoy contends that Blue Cross did not effectively amend its policy to
include an arbitration provision because it did not comply with a provision of the
former Insurance Code, which required a nonprofit insurer, such as Blue Cross, to file
a copy of any endorsement with the insurance commissioner and obtain approval of
the form before delivering it to subscribers. Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-16(l)(a) (Supp.
1985). Under that statute, any form would be deemed approved unless rejected within
fifteen days by the insurance commissioner. Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-16(l)(b) (Supp.
1985). McCoy argues, again, for the first time in this appeal, that fifteen days had
not passed from the time the endorsement was filed with the insurance commission
and the time it was mailed to subscribers. Therefore, the argument goes, Blue Cross

5

The fact that the Nelsen Affidavit states that Progressive's employees presorted the
envelopes in order to obtain a discount on the postage rate does not mean that the materials
were not mailed first class. Under the postal regulations in effect at the time of the First
Mailing, a presort discount was available on first class mail. Direct Marketing Ass'n v.
U.S. Postal Service. 778 F.2d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 1985).
295755.1
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violated the statute. However, this argument was not raised in the district court, and
McCoy cannot raise it now. Connor v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 1998 Utah
LEXIS 67 (Utah 1998); Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998). Had this
argument been raised below, Blue Cross would have had the opportunity to show that
it had obtained the approval of the insurance commissioner before sending out the
endorsement, and therefore complied with the statute. Blue Cross never had that
opportunity, and this argument cannot properly be considered on appeal.6
McCoy next cites § 31A-21-106(2) of the Utah Insurance Code for the
proposition that the arbitration provision is unenforceable because McCoy did not
"agree" to it. That statute provides:
Except as provided in Subsection (3) or (4), or as otherwise
mandated by law no purported modification of the contract during
the term of the policy affects the obligations of a party to the
contract unless the modification is in writing and agreed to by the
party against whose interest the modification operates.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-106(2) (Supp. 1996).

6

Even assuming that Blue Cross had not yet obtained approval when the endorsements
were mailed, the amendment would nevertheless have become effective with respect to the
McCoy policy when the endorsement was approved, or when the Insurance Code was
amended in 1986. It seems that by raising a number of new issues on appeal (e.g., first
class mailing, the supposedly missing letters, and compliance with Section 31-37-16(l)(b)),
McCoy is trying to give this Court any possible reason to reject the mandatory arbitration
clause, appealing to some hoped for judicial hostility toward arbitration. See Brief of
Appellee, pp. 43-49. McCoy's view that the arbitration process is somehow rigged in favor
of insurance companies is an outdated and unquestionably rejected approach to the question
of arbitrability.
295755.1
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Plaintiff fails to consider that he explicitly agreed, under the terms of the
policy, that the industry standard practice of notice by mail was acceptable, and would
constitute adequate notice of modification. In addition, McCoy explicitly agreed,
under the terms of the policy, that Blue Cross had the "absolute right" to modify the
Policy upon such notice. Specifically, under the policy, McCoy explicitly agreed that
the terms of riders duly issued by Blue Cross became part of the agreement:
"Agreement" means this document and attached riders when duly
issued by the Plan, the Subscriber's Identification Card issued in
connection with this document, the Subscriber's health statement,
and the Subscriber's application in any supplemental applications to
the Plan for healthcare benefits thereunder.
(R. 202) (emphasis added). Under the policy, McCoy explicitly agreed to abide by
any modification of the terms of the policy upon written notice:
D.

MODIFICATION OF AGREEMENT

The Plan shall at all times have the absolute right to modify or
amend this Agreement from time to time; provided, however, that
no such modification or amendment shall be effective until thirty
(30) days after written notice thereof has been given to the
Subscriber.
(R. 202) (emphasis added).
Finally, under the policy, McCoy explicitly agreed that notice as provided
for in the policy would be deemed received once placed in the mail:
Notices. Any notice to the Subscriber provided for in this
Agreement shall be deemed to have been given to and received by
the Subscriber when deposited in the United States Mail with first
class postage prepaid and addressed to the Subscriber at the address
shown on the records of the Plan.
295755.1
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If the insurer offers or purports to renew the policy, but on c
favorable terms or at higher rates, the new terms or rates take
effect on the renewal date if the insurer delivered or sent by first
class mail to the policyholder notice of the new terms or rates at
'• least 30 days prior to the expiration date of the prior policy.
u u u n -., A;.,:

303(5)(a).

There is no real conflict in the two statutory sections. Section 106(2) addresses the
295755.1

13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

problem of an insurer collecting a premium based on one contract, then making that
contract less favorable. Section 303(5) specifically addresses renewals, and
specifically authorizes changes to be made by sending notice by mail. McCoy's
argument, if accepted, would make it more difficult for an insurer to modify a policy
than to cancel it. In order to make a minor modification to a continuing policy, an
insurer would have to characterize its action as a cancellation, coupled with an offer to
issue a new, modified policy. By including renewals in section 303(5), Utah's
Insurance Code spares insurers these legal gymnastics, and insureds the confusion that
they would engender.
McCoy next argues that the arbitration provision is invalid because Blue
Cross did not comply with Utah Admin. R. 540-122-4(5), which requires that, before
an insurer can make a binding arbitration provision part of a policy, it must include in
the application or binder "a prominent statement substantially as follows":
ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND THE
COMPANY MAY BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO COURT ACTION PURSUANT TO THE
RULES OF (THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
OR OTHER RECOGNIZED ARBITRATOR), A COPY OF
WHICH IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST FROM THE
COMPANY. ANY DECISION REACHED BY ARBITRATION
SHALL BE BINDING UPON BOTH YOU AND THE
COMPANY. THE ARBITRATION AWARD MAY INCLUDE
ATTORNEY'S FEES IF ALLOWED BY STATE LAW AND
MAY BE ENTERED AS A JUDGMENT IN ANY COURT OF
PROPER JURISDICTION.

295755.1
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-•

The regulation also requires that the disclosure be made prior to the exetui-

i

tl c insurance contract. Id.
L:

.,: .:., ^cuui,!^n was not even

adopted until 1989, three years altu Blue Cross amended Mi ( \ \ \ \ policy i • include
i: vbitratioi. p i - \ V L-^_vvi>

• ;

\ 'dmil:o Mtn r\ M. was presented in Imperial Sav. Ass'n v.
• •

insurer's failure

h iiicu case, the Insured argued that the
1 R540-1

i" an uiMiiariu1 policy's ail bid Jl'ion

provision unenforceable. However, the policy had been Issued nine months before the
regulation wa^ enacted

Tnd^r Winder rejected the insured's argument, statin^

The iau aiai jUK IKSUIMJ uio u-r- meet mc pi.* i disclosure
guidelines ot the Rule, promulgated some nine months altci .-.n
Policy was issued, does not render this arbiliauon piovision imalh:
r
l he di>.-h^uie requirements did not become effective until after the
Rule was promulgated. The court, therefore, iuuf uo biatuiui)
impedinieni u ) the Pi iliey's arbitration proviso ML
| Si
Ill JIII III"i7"
> The same i.s line In• • • • Uhie "I "loss lould hardly have anticipated the

enactment of the regulation some three years later. P'o' dip- I-MSUH, (in rcgulalion
does not prevent enforcement of the arbitration provision.
In addition llie icgulatioii is uncnloiceable, lor two reasons. First, the

mandatory clauses such as thai required by the regulation.7 Utah Code Ann.
u'dioi. M . *.: ji.Mi; p;,:\id^.. " I he commissioner may not adopt maiiu^ =•
. A u clauses " i Mali (lode Ann. § 31A-21-203(1). The statute does allow the
commissioner b: ,«. nn authorized clauses, but only upon making certain limited findng.s
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Id.

§ 31A-21-203(1). Second, the United States Supreme Court has held that a similar
statute was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, because it conditioned the
enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice
requirement not applicable to contracts generally.8 Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
CasarattQ, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
In Casaratto, the Court considered a Montana statute which provided that,
for an arbitration provision to be enforceable, the first page of the contract had to
contain a notice provision typed in underlined capital letters. This statute was held
unlawful under § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides that written
arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
Section 2, the Court explained, prohibits states from "singling out arbitration
provisions for suspect status," and requires that "such provisions be placed 'upon the

7

(...continued)
There is no evidence that such findings were made here. In any event, the regulation does
not merely authorize the disclosure clause, but mandates it. For this reason, it is prohibited
by § 31A-21-203Q).
8

The Federal Arbitration Act applies in this case. The Act is applicable to any
"contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce. . . . " 9 U.S.C. § 2. McCoy's
policy clearly "involves commerce." In the district court, Blue Cross submitted the Affidavit
of Linda Nelson, which established that the policy provided the McCoys with coverage
throughout the United States, that "Blue Cross pays claims arising in many states other than
Utah to providers throughout the country," that "Blue Cross enters into agreements with
other Blue Cross Plans throughout the country in order to provide this coverage," and that
M
[c]laims are investigated and processed over interstate telephone lines and are frequently
made and paid using the United States mail." (R. 216-218).
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same footing as other contracts '" Casaratto, 517 IJ.S at 687. Tijr (our. leiterated
1:1: lat states may n ::: t "decide 1:1: lat a coi lti act is fair enough to enforce n i :i ^a^c terms
(price, service, credit), but not fair enough to ei lforce its ai biti atioi I :lause •." Id. ;:: it
686.9
. [w. icguiatKiii ci» i-^^uc here is Miiul;nl\ flawed
enforceabiiir us contracts genu
at.

uihjwlui
^

f

It conditions the .
•

>:,,.:

he regulation & preempted b> die Federal Arbitration Act,

Ma ov ^ u :iancc on the regulation ^ misplaced; there is simply no

^

i •:•• .

.irbitration provision.

11 1111. COURI DETERMINES THAT MR,
.\K-roVS POLI* ^ U \S EFFECTIVELY
AMENDED TO *v t i ' D l A> \RBITRATION
PROVISION, REMAND TO 'I II K TRIAI , COI J RT
FOR CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S
ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS IS NOT THE
PROPER REMEDY.
McCoy aieucs that, m ihc c\cik iliii, Court determines that Mr. McCoy's
policy included ai .-;»iiiaiior piovision -he rrvirt should remand the case to the trial
i ml liu nmsidcj ilinn il M<<'u\ » alh'i n,ifm JIjjiiincni*. a; In M h) hi1 should nol be

" " I he regulation also violates the Utah Arbitration Act, w hich, like the Federal Act,
requii es courts to enforce arbitration provisions. Utah Code Ann. 78-31a-4(l) (1985); Buzas
Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 947 n.5 (Utah 1996) ("[T]he provisions of the
Utah Arbitration Act are nearly identical to those contained in the Federal Arbitration Act.").
Accordingly, the Utah Act, like its Federal counterpart, should be construed to invalidate the
.regulation. Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947 n.5 ("Identity in language fin Utah and federal statutes]
presumes identity in construction, so that we look: to federal law for guidance/')
(quoting Brickyard Homeowner's Ass'n Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d
535, 540 (Utah 1983)).
295755 .,,1
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required to arbitrate. Remand, however, is not the proper remedy; McCoy should
have raised all of his arguments in this appeal. Issues that could be raised in a first
appeal, but are not raised, are thereafter waived. MacKay v. Hardy, 1998 Utah
LEXIS 93 (Utah 1998) (citing Debrv v. Cascade Enters, 935 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah
1997)). "The reason for this rule is simple: Judicial economy and the parties' interests
in the finality of judgments are in no way furthered if parties are allowed to engage in
piecemeal appeals." Id.
McCoy raised a panoply of arguments in the trial court as to the
enforceability of the arbitration provisions. The trial court based its denial of Blue
Cross' Motion to Compel Arbitration on the issue of notice of amendment. However,
it is axiomatic that an appellate court can uphold a trial court's decision for any reason
supported by the record. Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069,
1078 n.20 (Utah 1991); Projects Unlimited Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.,
798 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1990). For that reason, McCoy should have raised all
arguments supporting the trial court's denial of Blue Cross' Motion to Compel
Arbitration in this appeal. Failure to do so constituted a waiver of those arguments.
McCoy's proposed remedy of remand, if accepted, could result in an endless number
of piecemeal appeals. Such a result is contrary both to Utah law and to common
sense. McCoy's request for remand for consideration of his other arguments should
therefore be denied.
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IV

T H E PRESUMPTION" IN FAV OR OF
ARBITRATION APPI J E S IN ' IT IIS CA~~

Mi < '("v asserts |||||l|i. polu. \ i oiisuleialions weiui against UK enlorcement of
the mandatory arbitration provision in this case. In d

|» ,u Mel o\ ignutes the

strong public polic\ favoring arbiiration evidenced h\ i>nth liie Federal Arbitration Act
,::

..: ,i v\cii ^ inn ij/iviive cn^e ln\v McCoy's arguments

agaiil^l aibiiidi

;..

Legislature, wind* •>•.-;!• enacted legislation upholding the validity of arbitration
clauses
'*••

1

t; osuihaoiv, those bodies d'd ~r,t enact tha' legislation blindK

•'•-•:d(.^-

.!•!.;_ -•

. . M . .;. l a g c s i>i a r m u a i i o i i . d <>se

bodies determined that the advantages of arbitration • * * =

i:K-

adverse effects.
v

M.j.*..n-.

Act

,C

re fiects

•... * ,ias stated that "the Utah Arbitration

a long standing polic) fa> 01 ing speedj T mid ine xpensi \ e • methods • :)f

adjudicating dis()utes

/as. Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 94 ±, 7 w

•* *u.. 1996) (internal uiauun omitted). The court has also noted that "[t]he Territory
iiiiu iiin.nr ol lll.'ili ILINC had MlLiliilni \ pin ISIOIIS lni ai biliutl ion nil disputes sinii: liSM "

11

' For example, McCoy offers general arguments against jrhiiiaOon. Nueh i\< Hn: t.u;
that arbitrator's decision does not have a slave decisis effect, thai arbitration is not inducted
publicly, that discovery may be limited, that evidentiary object inns may be handled
differently, and that arbitrators are somehow the servants of insurance companies. These
arguments fail to overcome the strong public policy favoring arbitration, and present no
legitimate reason why Blue Cross should not be able to compel arbitration of Mr McCoy's
claims.
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Robinson & Wells. P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983), and that
"arbitration is favored in the law." Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah
1932). In short, many years of jurisprudence have rejected the notion of arbitration as
an inferior remedy. In light of this strong public policy, McCoy's attacks at
arbitration generally are clearly insufficient to overcome the enforceability of Blue
Cross' valid arbitration provision.
McCoy also contends that the arbitration provision is somehow unfair
because it "worked only one way," since "Blue Cross would never have any reason to
appeal its own decision." This argument misses the point: Just as the arbitration
provision gives Blue Cross the right to compel the arbitration of a claim brought
against it in court, it also gave Mr. McCoy the right to force Blue Cross into
arbitration, without having to incur the expenses associated with traditional litigation.
In other words, the arbitration provision meant that Mr. McCoy did not have to file a
lawsuit in order to obtain independent review of Blue Cross' denial of his claim. This
provision cannot truly be called one-sided. It confers an obvious benefit upon each of
the parties, and its validity is supported by controlling law.
Finally, McCoy contends that the arbitration provision is unenforceable in
this case for constitutional reasons, because he did not unequivocally and knowingly
waive his right to a jury trial. However, McCoy overlooks the well-established
principle of Utah law that arbitration provisions are not strictly construed. Rather,
they are liberally construed in favor of arbitration. Lindon City v. Engineers Const.
295755.1

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981N Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc..
/M i /!m -171 (Ihali i*JKu»

Kr<|iini

. waivci would, in essence,

amount to strict construciioii t^nnsi diuniatioii. \
If all doubts arc resohed in ! r.»»: of arbitration, as Utah law requires,11 arbitration
ill 1 necess.

-

-. . ^ases, or cases in w liich one party claims he

did not understand the clause "<

W 11 • I«- (In ih'lil- in a<ivs«. d. I lie . iuh

ai id to jury trials are of consiiuuional importance, they are not sacrosanct, and courts •
• r. uu: iti vjwv*n.-.

Utah
'N

n. . *.

. intentionally waivrd

p

Constitution is the lundamcntai ii6iii to ^ontiau. Utah

ion

See also Section. 27. Blue Cross contracted with M? McCoy, since H<v , LL~. ^

covei age • :if the I\ IcCo) s w as si ibject to a i ight in both parties to compel the favored
remedy of arbitration, flic clause is mi; ;.;•

- ^• -.. ,

favored under Utah law .<nd ,^-j tonsiuh-o hioadly. Lindon City, Oio P.2u x^iw
11 Kali IM
' 1

, ..^uiei mi vein i m p

-

M An

* rtJtah 1986)

Tlu- TT' .-; S ;preme

•>ec e.g., Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady bysiuhs, mi., / M t . *• * :. • •'So- Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co., 636 P 2d KFn 107 s r!!t;ih i- * ;
.bven oubidc the arbitration context, ooth the nghi u> a jury trial and access to the
courts are easily unintentionally waived. One need onl\ omii a jury demand, or fail to pay a
fee to waive a jury trial. Utah R Civ. Pro. 38(d) * 198 7). There is nothing knowing or
voluntary about such an omission, and \c\ *s ;- hnuluu- Snmlailv one may waive access to
the courts effectively by merely allowing a statute ol hmitai'-'ns • • ui?;, oi failing D take
other simple actions (such as complying v. ill. IIK IHIICV leqm/eincnis o! governmental
immunity acts).
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Court has squarely rejected the notion that such unambiguous and statutorily favored
contracts violate a party's right to court access or a jury trial. Lindon City, 636 P.2d
at 1074. In short, there is no constitutional impediment to the enforcement of the
arbitration provision in this case.
CONCLUSION
Gerald McCoy's insurance policy was effectively amended in 1985 to include
a mandatory arbitration provision. Blue Cross has demonstrated, by a preponderance
of the evidence, the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. Blue Cross submitted
abundant evidence establishing that the endorsement amending the policy was mailed
to Mr. McCoy, and that evidence is sufficient under controlling Utah law and the
express terms of McCoy's policy. Mr. McCoy has presented no legitimate reason
why the arbitration provision should not be enforced, relying instead on general
attacks against arbitration and his testimony that he doesn't remember receiving the
endorsement. Such arguments are simply insufficient to overcome the evidence
presented by Blue Cross. The proper forum for Mr. McCoy's claims against Blue
Cross is arbitration. The trial court's order denying Blue Cross' Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Stay Proceedings should be reversed.
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